National Collaborating Centre for Environmental Health



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# COVID-19 Risks and Precautions for Choirs

#### NCCEH Evidence scan

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Choral Canada August 19, 2020



# Outline

### 1. About NCCEH

- 2. Notable COVID-19 outbreaks related to choirs
- 3. Understanding transmission risks
- 4. Precautionary measures
- 5. Emerging research
- 6. Q&A





Outdoor Air



-



Water

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Contaminants and hazards



Climate 444

Food

#### **Emerging Public Health Issues**

<u>×</u>

### e.g. COVID-19

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### COVID-19 resources for EH

### Full report available at <u>NCCEH.CA</u> ...and many other COVID-19 resources





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## Notable outbreaks



#### Skagit Valley Washington,

- 53 cases of 61 person choir, three hospitalizations, 2 deaths
- Low community spread, avoided physical contact, used hand sanitizer
- Long duration, minimal spacing (15-25 cm), limited ventilation



#### Berlin Cathedral Choir, Germany

- 60 cases of 80 persons who attended a March 9 practice
- One member reported a positive COVID-19 test March 14
- Within two weeks, 30 positive and 30 additional symptomatic



#### Amsterdam Mixed Choir, Netherlands

- 102 cases of 130 person choir, four deaths (1 member, 3 associated persons)
- Multiple rehearsals Feb 25-Mar 7
- Symptomatic persons reported on Mar 3, 7 rehearsals and March 8 performance



#### French choirs

- Feb 28 Whir au Val (Haut-Rhin) 20 choristers and 69 secondary cases; 9 deaths
- Mar 12 Men's choir practice, 19 cases of 27 participants, 7 hospitalizations, no deaths;
- Connected to another choir where several members reported symptoms

**But** outbreaks have occurred in other group settings where there was no singing – why are choirs special?

Settings of published outbreaks to Apr 2020





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## Common factors in many outbreaks

- Indoors
- Crowded spaces
- Close contacts
- Lots of interaction (greeting, talking, laughing, cheering, shouting, singing, sharing of food/objects)
- Long duration of interaction
- Poor ventilation
- Prevalence of community spread of the virus (symptomatic and asymptomatic)



Large respiratory droplets – direct exposure when in close contact with an infected person who is sneezing, coughing (droplets >  $5 \mu m$ )

Smaller respiratory droplets/aerosols – direct exposure from close contact or indirect exposure from accumulated aerosols (droplets of < 5 µm)

Contact with contaminated surfaces/fomites followed by contact with nose, mouth, or eyes

# Particle size

### • Large droplets ( $\geq$ 5~10 µm)

- More likely to fall to the ground at short distance
- Intense but less frequently release in coughs/sneezes
- More likely expelled by symptomatic persons

• Upper airway

### • Smaller droplets/aerosols (< 5 μm)

- Less likely to fall to ground at short distance
- May persist in the air for longer/accumulate
- Less intense release but could be generated continuously
- Generated by symptomatic <u>AND</u> asymptomatic/presymptomatic persons
- Potential to reach lower respiratory tract

10 µm

) 1 µm

0.1 µm SARS-CoV-2 Singing in groups: Risks associated with **large** gatherings

- Close contact while greeting, talking, laughing, sharing of sheet music, stands, microphones
  - Increases risk of exposure to respiratory droplets and short-range aerosols
- Gathering in large numbers for prolonged
   duration indoors
  - Increases risk of exposure to accumulated aerosols
  - Limited ventilation reduces the dilution and dispersion of aerosols
- Sharing of surfaces or objects such as musical stands, chairs, books, microphones, instruments, food, dishes, drink dispensers
  - Increased risk of exposure via fomites

Singing in groups: Risks associated with increased emission of droplets

- A combination of processes can affect **Quantity** and the **Size** of particles released during vocalization
- Main mechanisms for production of droplets during vocalization are fluid-film burst in the bronchioles
- Droplets release may also originate in the larynx and oral cavity

Singing in groups: Risks associated with increased emission of droplets

#### Quantity

- Vocalization of any type releases a higher concentration of particles than breathing
- Singing releases more particles than speaking
- Particle release is affected by:
  - Volume (Louder = more aerosols)
  - Vocalization style/enunciation
  - Deep exhalation and rapid inhalation
  - Super-emitters

### Particle size

Singing in groups: Risks associated with increased emission of droplets

- Studies have found that vocalization can produce a range of particle sizes
  - Smaller droplets dominate ( $\leq$  5-10 µm)
  - Up to 80% are  $\leq$  1  $\mu$ m
  - Smaller droplets can remain suspended and travel further than large droplets
  - Smaller droplets are much more likely to penetrate the lower respiratory tract

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### Minimizing the Risks: Distancing

- Maintaining 2 m between participants helps reduce spread due to LARGE respiratory droplets
- Distancing can also help to reduce some of the short-range transmission of smaller droplets
- Maintaining distance is easier in larger venues/rooms
- Ensure distancing is maintained for <u>ALL</u> activities, not just while singing (e.g. entry/exit, warm up spaces, bathrooms)
- Additional barriers or partitions could be considered where practical to do so and distancing is difficult to maintain

### Minimizing the Risks: Reduce density and duration

- Larger spaces with fewer faces
  - Reduced loading of infectious particles; increased dilution and dispersion of accumulated aerosols
- Shorter duration (e.g. 30 minutes) and breaks between rehearsal or performance
  - Reduces accumulation of potentially infectious particles
  - Breaks should be in a different location, and not compromise distancing principles

### Minimizing the Risks: Ventilation

Outdoors and uncrowded

Large indoor space with mechanical/natural ventilation (high ACH)

> Smaller indoor space with mechanical or natural ventilation (high ACH)

> > Avoid confined indoor space & no ventilation

### Minimizing the Risks: Personal measures

- Symptomatic or potentially exposed persons should stay home
- High risk/susceptible persons should stay home
- Face coverings if possible wear at all times, particularly where closer encounters are more likely (More on masks in the Q&A)
- Hand hygiene
- Avoid close contact, handshakes, sharing of objects/equipment

## Risk Assessment

- Various approaches (WHO, Spahn and Richter 2020, PHAC, etc.)
- Consider the specific circumstance
  - Risk level of participants
  - Risk level of the venue
  - Risk level of the activity
  - Level of community transmission
- Consider mitigation potential
  - Hierarchy of controls/mitigation measures, local PH advice
- Does mitigation eliminate or reduce risks sufficiently?

| nitigation percentage score. By c<br>with the current modifications and | onnecting the two scores, the use<br>Lother planning considerations in                | er will be able to identify the over<br>place | rall risk of COVID-19 spread sko | uld the mass gathering occur |   |  |                                 |  |  |  |
|---|---|---|----------------------------------|------------------------------|---|--|---------------------------------|--|--|--|
| Total Risk Assessme<br>Total Mitigation Sco                             | D-19 Risk Evaluatio<br>Mitigation Tab (%)   | n Tab   | 2                                | :                            | Very low Risk   |  |                                 |  |  |  |
| Risk Versus Mitigati  |   |   |                                  |                              | Observance of Minimum Distance (radial 2m/61/2 feet,<br>or 1,5m lateral and 2m in front, staggered arrangement) | t,   |                                 |  |  |  |
|   |   | Total Mitigat                                 | ion Score (%)                    |                              |   | Closed spaces  | Remarkable<br>reduction of Risk |  |  |  |
| Total Risk Score  | 76-100  | 51-75   | 26-50                            | 0-25                         |   | <ul> <li>Very large ("Cathedral-Situation")</li> </ul>   |                                 |  |  |  |
| 0   | VERY LOW  | VERY LOW                                      | VERY LOW                         | LOW                          |   | <ul> <li>High air exchange rate (HAVAC (6/h)) or sufficient<br/>intermittent ventilation (CO<sub>2</sub>-traffic light)</li> </ul> |                                 |  |  |  |
| 1   | VERY LOW  | LOW   | LOW                              | MODERATE                     |   | <ul> <li>Wearing surgical masks while singing</li> <li>Specific Measures in Brass-/Wind Instruments</li> </ul>                     |                                 |  |  |  |
| 2   | LOW   | LOW   | MODERATE                         | MODERATE                     |   | (Shields, condensation water)  |                                 |  |  |  |
| 3   | MODERATE  | MODERATE                                      | HIGH                             | HIGH                         |   |  |                                 |  |  |  |
| 4   | HIGH  | HIGH  | VERY HIGH                        | VERY HIGH                    | :   | Abnormalities during entrance screening<br>No observance of distances  |                                 |  |  |  |
| 5   | VERY HIGH   | VERY HIGH                                     | VERY HIGH                        | VERY HIGH                    |   | (radial 2m, or 1,5m lateral and 2m in front),  | High Risk                       |  |  |  |
|   | -   |   |                                  |                              |   | Too many people in a room  | Ŭ                               |  |  |  |
| KEY   |   |   |                                  |                              |   | Insurficient ventilation   |                                 |  |  |  |
| VERY LOW  | Overall risk of transmission and further spread of COVID-19 is considered<br>VERY LOW |   |                                  |                              |   |  |                                 |  |  |  |
| LOW   | Overall risk of transmission and further spread of COVID-19 is considered             |   |                                  |                              |   | Absence of Risk awareness<br>Absence of Risk reducing measures   | Ultra-High risk                 |  |  |  |
| MODERATE  | Overall risk of transmission and further spread of COVID-19 is considered             |   |                                  |                              |   | 5  |                                 |  |  |  |
| HIGH  | Overall risk of transmission and further spread of COVID-19 is considered             |   |                                  |                              | Spahn/Richter 2020: Risiko Management Corona in the field of musi   |  |                                 |  |  |  |
| VERY HIGH   | Overall risk of transmission and further spread of COVID-19 is considered             |   |                                  |                              |   | assessment of the infection fisk depending on the fisk-reducing measures (based on the Nohl 2019)                                  |                                 |  |  |  |
|   |   |   |                                  |                              |   |  |                                 |  |  |  |

Table 3. Matrix for determining overall risk of contributing to COVID-19 community transmission and next steps

|                              |        | Risk mitigation potential (from Table 2)  |   |  |  |  |  |  |
|------------------------------|--------|---|---|--|--|--|--|--|
|                              |        | Stronger  | Moderate  | Weaker   |  |  |  |  |
| Risk level<br>(from Table 1) | High   | Moderate risk<br>of contributing to COVID-<br>19 community<br>transmission. Increase or<br>strengthen mitigation<br>strategies if possible. | Higher risk<br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Consider delaying reopening.<br>Increase or strengthen<br>mitigation strategies. | Highest risk<br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Consider delaying reopening.<br>Increase or strengthen<br>mitigation strategies. |  |  |  |  |
|                              | Medium | <b>Lower risk</b><br>of contributing to COVID-<br>19 community<br>transmission. Maintain<br>mitigation strategies.                          | Moderate risk<br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Increase or strengthen<br>mitigation strategies if<br>possible.                | Higher risk<br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Consider delaying reopening.<br>Increase or strengthen<br>mitigation strategies.  |  |  |  |  |
|                              | Low    | <b>Lowest risk</b><br>of contributing to COVID-<br>19 community<br>transmission. Maintain   | <b>Lower risk</b><br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Maintain mitigation strategies.  | Moderate risk<br>of contributing to COVID-19<br>community transmission.<br>Increase or strengthen  |  |  |  |  |

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# Emerging research (USA)

- International Coalition for the Performing Arts – preliminary results
  - Studies indicate that a higher concentration of respiratory particles are released during singing compared to breathing
  - Measurements indicate the effectiveness of masks and screens for reducing release of respiratory particles
  - Models of infection risk indicate risk increases over time; masks reduce risk overall

#### $Singing\,APS~$ (0.5-20 $\mu m$ particles)



#### Indoor Case Study: Mask Impact on Infection Risk

Infection risk r by Wells-Riley equation at the height of mouth opening, with breathing rate of 8 L/min.



International Coalition of Performing Arts. 2020

### Emerging research (Germany)

- Mürbe et al. 2020
  - Laser particle counter study, 8 subjects during breathing, speaking and singing.
  - Significantly higher emission rates for singing compared to mouth breathing and speaking; Emissions increased with volume
  - Variation between singers; Higher emission rates for phonation by females vs. males
- Hartmann and Kriegel 2020
  - Relationship between CO<sub>2</sub> and aerosol concentration
- Hartmann et al. 2020
  - Risk assessment of rehearsal rooms for choirs with regard to virus-laden aerosols; Compared rehearsal rooms, concert Halls and office space
- Kriegel and Hartmann 2020
  - Indoor risk assessment of virus laden aerosols..

See Spahn and Richter 2020. Risk Assessment of a Coronavirus Infection in the Field of Music. Fourth update (2020 July 17). https://www.mh-freiburg.de/en/university/covid-19-corona/riskassessment



**Figure 2.** Boxplots of the particle source strengths (bars represent the median) for different gender, voice classifications and tasks: mouth breathing, speaking and singing (left y-axis). Only particles  $\leq 5 \mu m$  were considered. For singing, the maximum sound pressure levels LAF<sub>MAX</sub> are also shown (full circles, right y-axis).

#### Mürbe et al. 2020

### Emerging research Risk Calculators

- COVID-19 Airborne Transmission Estimator (Jimenez 2020)
- Airborne Infection Risk Calculator (AIRC) (Mikszewski et al. 2020)
- Risk Analysis of the transmission of CARS-CoV-2 by aerosols (in German, Trukenmüller 2020)
- Essential inputs
  - Room dimensions
  - Air exchange
  - Number of persons
  - Duration of exposure

Estimation of COVID-19 aerosol transmission: master spreadsheet, adapt this one to your case

This is a general spreadsheet applicable to any situation, under the assumptions of this model - See notes specific to this case (if applicable) at the v
Important inputs as highlighted in orange - change these for your situation
Other, more specialized inputs are highlighted in yellow - change only for more advanced applications
Calculations are not highlighted - don't change these unless you are sure you know what you are doing
Results are in blue -- these are the numbers of interest for most people

#### Environmental Parameters

|                                | Value        |         |       | Value in other u | nits  | Source / Comments                 |
|--------------------------------|--------------|---------|-------|------------------|-------|-----------------------------------|
| Length of room                 | 20           | ft      |       | 6.1              | m     | Can enter as ft or as m (once     |
| Width of room                  | 20           | ft      | =     | 6.1              | m     | Can enter as ft or as m (once     |
|                                | 400          | sq ft   |       | 37               | m2    | Can overwrite the m2 one. If y    |
| Height                         | 8            | ft      | =     | 2.4              | m     | Can enter as ft or as m (once     |
| Volume                         |              |         |       | 91               | m3    | Volume, calculated. (Can also     |
| Pressure                       | 0.95         | atm     |       |                  |       | Used only for CO2 calculation     |
| Temperature                    | 20           | С       |       |                  |       | Use web converter if needed       |
| Relative Humidity              | 50           | %       |       |                  |       | Not yet used, but may eventua     |
| Background CO2 Outdoors        | 415          | ppm     |       |                  |       | See readme                        |
| Duration of event              | 30           | min     |       | 0.5              | h     | Value for your situation of inter |
| Number of repetitions of event | 1            | times   |       |                  |       | For e.g. multiple class meeting   |
| Ventilation w/ outside air     | 0.7          | h-1     |       |                  |       | Value in h-1: Readme: Same a      |
| Readme   FAQs                  | Master-Choir | Class S | ubway | Super 🤆          | ÷ : • |                                   |

| Airborne Infection                            | n Risk  | Calculator               | AIRC                              |  |   | 1151. Enter value202. Calculated value    |
|---|---------|--------------------------|-----------------------------------|--|---|---|
| 1. ROOM DIMENSIONS                            |         |                          | 5. EXPOSURE SCENARIO              | D  |   | 6. RESULTS                                |
| Room Area                                     | А       | 200 (m <sup>2</sup> )    | Infectious Occupant #1            |  |   | Susceptible Occupant A                    |
| Ceiling Height                                | h       | 4 (m)                    | Time of Entry                     | 0  | (minutes)                                 | Modeled Exposure Time (minutes) = 60      |
| Room Volume                                   | V       | $(m^3)$                  | Time of Exit                      | 60   | (minutes)                                 | Individual Infection Risk (%) = 1.06%     |
|   |         |                          | ER <sub>q</sub> from Selector Tab | 170  | (quanta/hr)                               | Exposure Time for 0.1% Risk (minutes) = 5 |
| 2. INFECTIOUS VIRAL R                         | REMOVAI | L RATE                   |                                   |  | -   | Exposure Time for 1% Risk (minutes) = 56  |
| Air Exchange Rate AER 0.5 (hr <sup>-1</sup> ) |         | Infectious Occupant #2   |                                   |  | Maximum Room Occupancy for $R_0 < 1 = 14$ |   |
| Particle Deposition Rate                      | k       | 0.24 (hr <sup>-1</sup> ) | Include in Model?                 | Yes  | -Select                                   |   |
| Viral Inactivation Rate                       | λ       | 0.63 (hr <sup>-1</sup> ) | Time of Entry                     | 60   | (minutes)                                 | Continuous Occupancy                      |
| Total Viral Removal Rate                      | IVRR    | $1.4 (hr^{-1})$          | Time of Exit                      | 120  | (minutes)                                 | Modeled Exposure Time (minutes) = 120     |
|   |         |                          | ER <sub>q</sub> from Selector Tab | 170  | (quanta/hr)                               | Individual Infection Risk (%) = 1.58%     |
| 3. INITIAL QUANTA CO                          |         |                          | -                                 | Exposure Time for 0.1% Risk (minutes) = 21 |   |   |
| <b>n</b> _0                                   | 0.0E+0  | (quanta/m³)              | Susceptible Occupant A            |  |   | Exposure Time for 1% Risk (minutes) = 86  |
|   |         |                          | Time of Entry                     | 60   | (minutes)                                 | Maximum Room Occupancy for $R_0 < 1 = 9$  |
| 4. TOTAL TIME OF OCC                          | Y       | Time of Exit             | 120                               | (minutes)                                  |   |   |
| Time t  | 120     | (minutes)                | IR from Selector Tab              | 0.54                                       | $(m^3/hr)$                                |   |
|   |         |                          |                                   |  |   |   |

### Emerging research Aerosols transmission

- Further understanding of transmission via aerosols
  - Additional evidence of viral RNA detected in the room air of COVID-19 patients. Improved understanding of how virus moves around the room – particles found deposited on window sills, under the bed (Santarpia et al. 2020);
  - Isolation of culturable virus from air sample of patient rooms > 2 m distance (Lednicky et al. 2020, pre-print)

Viral particles can be dispersed due to ambient air currents

#### These particles may be infectious

### What remains unknown?

Many questions remain...

- Movement and accumulation of aerosols in different indoor environments?
- How long do viral particles remain infectious and what is the infectious dose?
- Transmission by children, severity of disease, longer term effects
- Effectiveness of emerging technologies
  - Disinfection technologies
  - New types of coatings/surfaces
- Results of further outbreak investigations
  - Improve understanding of transmission for different settings, activities, groups etc.
- And more...

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thank you!

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